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UNTANGLING A TANGLED WEB WITHOUT TRIAL:
USING THE COURT'S INHERENT POWERS AND RULES
TO DENY A PERJURING LITIGANT HIS DAY IN COURT
JONATHAN M. STERN*

"Oh what a tangled web we weave,
When first we practice to deceive!"
-Sir Walter Scott 1771-1832
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I.

INTRODUCTION

PERJURY

IS A serious crime, punishable by fine, incarceration, or both.' Yet, more than a few litigants in civil cases
have chosen to lie under oath despite the fact that dollars, not
personal liberty, were at issue. Cross-examination at trial, many
would say, is the tool that we litigators have to expose the perjuring litigant and influence the trier of fact to come to ajust conclusion. This is not, however, the only means we have to address
such misconduct.
The common law, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and
the rules of civil procedure of many states also provide tools
that, in the right set of circumstances, can be used to dispose of
a suit (or a claim or defense within a suit) without a trial on the
basis of perjury, fabrication of evidence, or other serious misconduct of a litigant. When a suit can be won without the inherent risks of trial, why not use the available tools to do so?
This article addresses the role that the inherent powers of a
trial court and how Rules 11, 16, 26, 37, and 41 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (or their state counterparts) may play
(generally under the rubric of "fraud on the court" or the "clean
hands" doctrine) in disposing of one or more claims or defenses
in advance of trial. It does not deal with other sanctions that
may be available. 2 The article also does not address the separate
issue of relief from a judgment for fraud under Rule 60 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although several cases seeking
post-trial relief are discussed.' Several examples of factual sceSee, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1621 (2000).
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b) (2) (listing examples of sanctions); Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Watson, 413 S.E.2d 630 (Va. 1992) (invalidating the attorney-client privilege as a sanction for providing false answer to interrogatory).
" In general, it is more difficult to obtain relief from ajudgment for fraud than
it is to avoid a judgment in the first instance for fraud on the court. See, e.g.,
Davenport Recycling Assocs. v. Comm'r, 220 F.3d 1255, 1262 (lth Cir. 2000);
Gleason v.Jandrucko, 860 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1988); Mothershed v. Gregg, No. 926035, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 11635 (10th Cir. May 11, 1993); Chang v. Geary, No.
88-4780, 1994 Mass. Super. LEXIS 109 (Nov. 22, 1994). Nonetheless, numerous
courts, starting with the Supreme Court in Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire
Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944), have found fraud on the court a sufficient basis on
which to grant relief from ajudgment. ("This case involves the power of a Circuit
Court of Appeals, upon proof that fraud was perpetrated on it by a successful
litigant, to vacate its own judgment entered at a prior term and direct vacation of
a District Court's decree entered pursuant to the Circuit Court of Appeals' mandate."). Id. at 239. ("We have ... a case in which undisputed evidence filed with
the Circuit Court of Appeals in a bill of review proceeding reveals such fraud on
that Court as demands, under settled equitable principles, the interposition of
2
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narios that have resulted in dismissal or default are described.
The article then reviews the factors that courts will consider in
selecting the appropriate sanction. Also analyzed is the effect
that a finding of fraud on the court may have in related cases,
including the impact on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Finally, the article addresses the standards by which appellate
courts will review fraud on the court determinations.
II.

FRAUD ON THE COURT

The Supreme Court of the United States has stated that
"[f]alse testimony in a formal proceeding is intolerable. We
must neither reward nor condone such a flagrant 'affront' to
the truth-seeking function of adversary proceedings."4 The
"fraud on the court" doctrine provides a means of response to
such intolerable conduct.
Regardless of the specific tool utilized to deal with the perjuring litigant, the analysis usually comes down to whether there
has been a "fraud upon the court." Moreover, "fraud on the
court" is used as shorthand to describe a variety of improper acts
that may lead to sanctions under the rules of civil procedure or
pursuant to a court's inherent powers in managing its docket.
For example, in an oft-cited Supreme Court patent infringement case, the Court mandated reversal of a judgment that had
been entered in the patent-holder's favor.5 The evidence
showed that, when the application for the patent faced "insurmountable Patent Office opposition," the applicant's officials
and attorneys prepared and arranged for publication of an article, purportedly written by a disinterested expert, that was then
used to influence favorable treatment by the Patent Office and,
subsequently, by the circuit court of appeals in the infringement
case.6 This constituted fraud on the court and cost the patent
holder the case,' and perhaps the patent.
equity to devitalize the 1932 judgment despite the expiration of the term at
which the judgment was finally entered."). Id. at 247. See also Pearson v. NH
Mortg. Corp., 200 F.3d 30, 35-37 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that, instead of requiring presentation of a "smoking gun," discovery in a Rule 60 proceeding should be
allowed on a "colorable claim").
4 ABF Freight Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 323 (1994) (holding that NLRB
had discretion to grant an employee reinstatement with backpay even though the
employee gave false testimony under oath in an unfair labor practice
proceeding).
Hazel-Atlas Glass, 322 U.S. at 238.
Id. at 240-41.
7

Id. at 251.
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The Supreme Court has described fraud on the court as "a
wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard
the public."' While viewed as a wrong perpetrated on the system
rather than an individual litigant, 9 the judicial response to fraud
on the court can be of great benefit to the wrongdoer's opponent."0 In numerous cases, a litigant's fabrication, destruction, 1'
or suppression of evidence and related perjury has led to dismissal of the perjuring plaintiff's claim or default judgment against
the perjuring defendant. 12 Indeed, the combination of
fabrication of evidence and perjury has been described as a
"classic" example of fraud on the court.' 3
In Rockdale Management Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 4 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the trial judge
had not abused her discretion in dismissing the lawsuit because
of plaintiffs fraud. In that case, Rockdale Management Company had purchased real property at auction from Shawmut
Bank. Rockdale subsequently sued the bank for fraud and negligence for its failure to disclose environmental contamination of
the property. To bolster the damages case, Rockdale's president, Vincent Fernandes, created a letter that purported to be
an offer by Sun Refining and Marketing Company to lease the
subject property for a specified monthly amount. The letter was
referenced in an interrogatory response prepared by the plain246.
9 E.g., Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505, 507 (4th Cir. 1947); Smith v. Cessna
Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 107 (D. Md. 1989).
10 Unlike the defense of spoliation of evidence, which has in some jurisdictions
been recognized as an independent cause of action, fraud on the court is not
recognized as an independent cause of action because it is a wrong against the
judicial system. Nat'l Eng'g Serv. v. Galello, No. 92-05303, 1995 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 779 (May 3, 1995); see also Liberty Leather Corp. v. Callum, 653 F.2d 694,
700 (1st Cir. 1981) (holding that there is no cause of action for failure to provide
discovery); Marozsan v. United States, 849 F. Supp. 617, 645 (N.D. Ind. 1994)
(same).
II See generally Rolin P. Bissell & James M. Holston, Spoliation of Evidence: Recent
Expansion of an Old Theory (Washington Legal Foundation Contemporary Legal
Note Series No. 29, 1998).
2 E.g., Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944);
Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115 (1st Cir. 1989);Joza v. Million Air, Inc.,
No. 96-3165, slip op. at *8 (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2001); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 151 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Cal. 1993) affd, 69 F.3d 337 (9th Cir.
1998); Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390-291 (E.D. Cal.
1992); Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F. Supp. 1267, 1279 (E.D. Ky. 1986); Rockdale
Mgmt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 638 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1994).
"3 Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118.
14 638 N.E.2d 29 (Mass. 1994).
8 Id. at
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tiffs, and Fernandes testified in deposition that the letter was
authentic. Only after the nominal author testified that the letter
15
was a fake did Fernandes admit the forgery.
In affirming the dismissal, the appellate court relied on a trial
court's inherent power to dismiss a case when a litigant commits
a fraud on the court. The court wrote:
A "fraud on the court" occurs where it can be demonstrated,
clearly and convincingly, that a party has sentimentally set in motion some unconscionable scheme calculated to interfere with
the judicial system's ability impartially to adjudicate a matter by
improperly influencing the trier or unfairly hampering the presentation of the opposing party's claim or defense. 6
The court noted that determining whether a fraud on the
court has been committed is fact-specific and must be done on a
case-by-case basis.1 7
In addressing fraud on the court, some courts have resolved
factual disputes by deciding issues of credibility.' Others suggest a standard akin to summary judgment. 9 The fact that appellate courts review sanction determinations for abuse of
discretion and related factual findings for clear error strongly
suggests that trial courts are not bound by Rule 56 strictures in
15

Id. at 31.

16Id. (quoting Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118).
'7

Id. at 32.

18 E.g., Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indust. Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 n.2 (9th Cir. 1983)
(" [W] hen a district court makes findings of facts in connection with a motion for
sanctions, we review those findings under the clearly erroneous standard to determine whether they are supported by the record.") (citing Anderson v. Air West,
Inc., 542 F.2d 1090, 1093 (9th Cir. 1976); Hindmon v. National-Ben Franklin Life
Ins. Corp., 677 F.2d 617, 621 (7th Cir. 1982); Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 138
F.R.D. 675, 681 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (resolving factual issues and making credibility
determinations after evidentiary hearing), affd in part and vacated in part, remanded, 974 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1992) (upholding dismissal but remanding for
further proceedings on issue of monetary sanctions).
'9 See, e.g., Meador v. New Times, Inc., No. 92-1357 PHX ROS (SLV) 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11201, at *29-30 (D. Ariz. Aug. 2, 1995) (citing United States v.
Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1976), for proposition that "[o]ne of the
oldest established rules of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that the jury is the
arbiter of credibility of witnesses") ("In the absence of inconsistent representations to the Court or evidence which shows that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, the truthfulness of statements is necessarily a question for the
finder of fact, and not properly resolvable on a motion for summary judgment.");
Bower v. Weisman, 674 F. Supp. 109, 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("With respect to the
alleged forgery, the issue of who signed Weisman's signature on the document
and at whose direction is among ultimate issues in the trial, and will not now be
resolved or otherwise used as a basis for a sanction.").
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ruling on motions for sanctions. 2 1 In any case, courts will only
find that a fraud on the court has been committed where there
is clear and convincing evidence. 21 The "clear and convincing"
evidence requirement was satisfied in Rockdale Management, if for
no other reason, by the admission of Fernandes that he had
fabricated the letter, incorporated it into an interrogatory response, and testified-perjuriously-that the letter was authentic.
The appellate court also found the selection of the ultimate
sanction of dismissal within the trial court's discretion because it
was shown that Fernandes's fraudulent
conduct was "part of a
22
pattern or scheme to defraud.

While the evidence that will satisfy the "clear and convincing"
standard must be assessed on a case-by-case basis, some broad
generalizations can be made. Admission of the wrongdoing is a
frequent feature of cases in which the ultimate sanctions of default or dismissal are selected or sustained. 21 Where the contrary testimony of one witness is offered to show that the litigant
has committed perjury, the conflicting testimony will normally
be presented to the fact finder for resolution at trial. 24 The
same is true when the testimony or interrogatory response is ambiguous and subject to a construction that would not clearly be
untruthful. 25 On the other hand, where a litigant's own testimony is irreconcilably inconsistent, the court may invoke the
fraud on the court doctrine and deny that litigant a trial.26
See infra Section VIII for a discussion of standards of review on appeal.
E.g., Nichols v. Klein Tools, Inc., 949 F.2d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing
In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d
180 (8th Cir. 1976)); R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, No. 91 Civ. 5678 (CSH), 2000
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10170 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000); McDowell v. Seaboard Farms of
Athens, Inc., No. 95-609-CIV-ORL-19, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19558, at *6 (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 4, 1996).
22 Rockdale Mgmt. Co. v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 638 N.E.2d 29, 32 (1994).
25 See, e.g., Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 105 (D. Md. 1989);
Rockdale Mgmt., 638 N.E.2d at 31.
4 E.g., Chang v. Geary, No. 88-4780, 1994 Mass. Super. LEXIS 109 (Nov. 22,
1994). But see Anheuser-Busch, 151 F.R.D. at 346 (resolving conflicting stories by
holding evidentiary hearing and then dismissing for fraud on the court).
2_5 Wood v. Biloxi Pub. Sch. Dist., 757 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 2000).
2 , E.g., Aris-Isotoner Gloves, Inc. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 969
(S.D.N.Y. 1992), afffd without op., 983 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1992). See also Rogal v.
Am. Broad. Cos., No. 89-5235, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3683, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
29, 1994) (awarding sanctions after adverse verdict and judgment where contradictions and inconsistencies from defendant's own evidence reflected "utter contempt for the oath"), rev'd and remanded, 74 F.3d 40 (3d Cir. 1996) (finding trial
court's failure to hold an evidentiary hearing was, under the specifics of the case,
an abuse of discretion); Meador, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11201, at *29-30 ("In the
20

21
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So, for example, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reversed a
dismissal sanction in Wood v. Biloxi Public School District,2 7 where
the plaintiff was shown in surveillance videotape "walking normally, squatting, twisting, bending, and generally performing
normal daily functions without any indication of impairment or
pain" after answering an interrogatory about the extent of his
injuries by stating: "These injuries affected my attitude, my concentration, my school work, and my ability to do manual labor.
I no longer am able to enjoy tinkering with automobiles as the
stooping, bending, and squatting are painful. ' 28 The court held
that "[o]ne reasonable interpretation" of the interrogatory response was not "that he was incapable of bending, lifting, or performing manual labor, but rather that he was unable to enjoy
performing these tasks. 2 9
Finally, the courts usually will not dismiss or default a litigant
if the misconduct is in an area that is either irrelevant or peripheral to the case.3 0 For example, a case in which it "might be
relevant" whether plaintiff had sexual relations with men other
than the individual defendant was not dismissed as a result of
plaintiff's lying in deposition about the number of other men
with whom she had relations where she had testified that there
were such relationships.-1 Instead, the plaintiff was taxed with
costs, fees, and expenses of additional depositions that were ne32
cessitated by the perjury.
Accordingly, in a recent case arising out of an airline accident, counsel made a tactical decision not to seek dismissal
absence of inconsistent representationsto the Court or evidence which shows that there
is no genuine issue of material fact, the truthfulness of statements is necessarily a
question for the finder of fact, and not properly resolvable on a motion for summary judgment.") (emphasis added).
27 757 So. 2d 190 (Miss. 2000).
28

Id. at 192-93.

Id. at 194.
E.g., Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1120 n.3 (1st Cir. 1989). A
witness' credibility is always relevant and litigants almost always are witnesses in
their own cases. "Irrelevant" or "peripheral," as used in this sentence, is intended
to mean that the misconduct involves a subject matter that is itself irrelevant or
peripheral to the case, not that the misconduct will not be deemed relevant from
an evidentiary perspective.
31 Bower v. Weisman, 674 F. Supp. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("Under the circumstances here, Bower's perjury does not warrant dismissal. Bower had already
testified as to having sexual relations with others than Weisman during the time
period at issue. The belated addition of three more affairs-while very serious
due to the fact of the perjury itself-has little effect on the merits of the action for
the reasons stated.").
29

3o

32

Id. at 112-13.
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where the plaintiff made misrepresentations about peripheral
matters that were significant to his credibility but not directly
relevant to his claim. The plaintiff, who claimed only four days
of lost earnings, responded to an interrogatory about his work
history by stating that he had left a job as a police officer "to
pursue other opportunities and better pay." According to the
police department's records, however, the officer was terminated after he was charged with second-degree rape of a female
police officer. Moreover, presumably after he provided the details to his counsel, a supplemental interrogatory response was
served in which the answer was corrected to reflect that the police department had terminated him. With a significant sanction highly unlikely, counsel chose to save the information for
cross-examination at trial.
III.

CLEAN HANDS DOCTRINE

The "clean hands" doctrine is a longstanding equitable doctrine whose scope is broader than, but may encompass, fraud on
the court. It is "a self-imposed ordinance that closes the doors
of a court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad
faith relative to the matter in which he seeks relief, however improper may have been the behavior of the defendant.""3 The
doctrine has been invoked to dismiss -claims or defenses of litigants who have used underhanded means to advance their
cause. So, for example, in Mas v. Coca-Cola Co.,34 a plaintiff used
forged documents and perjured testimony in a failed attempt to
establish priority of invention before the Patent Office; the
plaintiff suffered a dismissal for coming into court with unclean
hands.15 The doctrine, flexible in application, permits a court
to exercise broad discretion to deny relief to a litigant who has
acted in an unconscionable way that "has immediate and necessary relation to the matter that he seeks in respect of the matter
in litigation."36 Accordingly, the clean hands doctrine does not
close the courthouse doors to a litigant simply because he is a
bad person; rather, relief is denied where a "violation [I] of conscience as in some measure affect[s] the equitable relations be33 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Main. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 81415 (1945).
'4 163 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1947).
35 Id. at 507.
36 Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933); accord
Precision Instrument. 324 U.S. at 814-15.
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tween the parties in respect of something brought before the
court for adjudication."37
The clean hands doctrine is one that the court applies, not for
the protection of the parties, but for its own protection. Its basis
was well stated by Professor Pomeroy as follows:
It assumes that the suitor asking the aid of a court of equity has
himself been guilty of conduct in violation of the fundamental
conceptions of equity jurisprudence, and therefore refuses him
all recognition and relief with reference to the subject-matter or
transaction in question. It says that whenever a party, who, as
actor seeks to set the judicial machinery in motion and obtain
some remedy, has violated conscience, or good faith, or other
equitable principle, in his prior conduct, then the doors of the
court will be shut against him in limine; the court will refuse to
interfere on his behalf, to acknowledge his right, or to award him
any remedy. "8
Another passage by this authoritative writer on equity jurisprudence, thus states the rule: "It is not alone fraud or illegality
which will prevent a suitor from entering a court of equity; any
really unconscientious conduct, connected with the controversy
to which he is a party, will repel him from the forum whose very
foundation is good conscience. '""

An example of application of the clean hands doctrine is
found in Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.4" In Smith, the pilot of a
1956 Cessna Model 182 airplane that crashed following loss of
engine power sued the manufacturer of the airplane for an alleged fuel system defect. The pilot broke both his legs in the
crash and sought damages for income lost from his contracting
business, pain and suffering, and other compensatory, as well as
punitive, damages.
During discovery, Cessna propounded an interrogatory that
asked the pilot to state his income in various years "as reflected
by your federal income tax returns."'" Cessna also served a corresponding request for production of tax returns for the years
about which income information was requested in the interrogatory.4 2 The pilot responded to the discovery by providing dollar amounts of income for each of the years requested, agreeing
37

Keystone Driller,290 U.S. at 245.

38 JOHN

NORTON POMEROy, EQUITYJURSPRUDENCE

41

Id. at § 404; see also Mas, 163 F.2d at 507-8.
124 F.R.D. 103 (D. Md. 1989).
Id. at 104.

42

Id.

39
40

§ 397 (5th ed. 1941).
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to produce the requested tax returns, and producing portions of
tax returns for the years requested. After several requests by
Cessna's counsel to the pilot's counsel for the missing portions
of the tax returns, the pilot's attorney advised Cessna's counsel
that an authorization would be provided so that Cessna could
obtain the missing documents directly from the Internal Revenue Service. "When [the pilot's] attorney asked his client to execute the authorization, however, he learned for the first time
that his client had in fact failed to file any tax returns for the
4
years 1983 through 1987." Shortly thereafter, the pilot filed a supplemental interrogatory response with wording over which his lawyer undoubtedly
agonized. It read:
The amounts stated with respect to the years 1983 through 1986
in the [pilot's] original answers to this interrogatory are probably
in error. The purported portions of income tax returns furnished by the plaintiff to the defendants through counsel, as being portions of plaintiffs income tax returns are, in fact, not
portions of any income tax returns filed by the plaintiff with the
Internal Revenue Service. Income tax returns for the plaintiff
for the years 1983 through 1987 are being prepared with the assistance [of a certified public accountant] identified below, and
copies hereof will be furnished to the defendants as soon as the
same can be completed.4 4
The pilot had been asked about his income at his deposition.
A follow-up deposition was agreed upon in light of the supplemental interrogatory responses. At the second deposition, the
pilot admitted that he had "hedged" an answer about filing his
tax returns, implying that he had filed returns. Asked whether
he wanted the lawyers to think that his answer to the income
interrogatory had come from federal tax returns, the pilot re45
sponded: "I assumed that that is what you would think, yes.
The following questions and answers led to an admission of
perjury:

Q. So your affirmation at the end that this is true under penalty
A.

of perjury, that is not accurate, is it?
The answers to the interrogatories in that instance is [sic]
not correct.

44

Id. at 105.
Id.

45

Id.

43
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Q. So your statement you declare under penalty of perjury that
the foregoing answers and responses are true and correct,
that certification signed by you was not accurate, was it?
A. In this case, that is correct.
Q. So you committed perjury in that case, didn't you?
A. I would believe you would call it that, yes.
Q. What would you call it? You would call it perjury, too?
A. Yes. 46
Armed with admissions by the plaintiff pilot that he had committed perjury in his first deposition and his interrogatory responses and that he had "committed fraud by submitting false
tax returns in response to Cessna's request for production of
documents," 47 Cessna moved, pursuant to the clean hands doctrine and Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to
48
dismiss the pilot's complaint.
The clean hands doctrine in its traditional formulation applied against those parties asserting equitable claims or defenses
where they arrived before the chancellor with unclean hands.4 9
In fact, the clean hands doctrine is unique among the tools for
fighting fraud on the court in its applicability solely to misconduct of those (typically, but not always, plaintiffs) seeking the
application of equity.5" When applied in this way, the doctrine
does not call for a balancing of the misconduct on both sides of
46 Smith
47 Id.
48

v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 105 (D. Md. 1989).

Id.

See, e.g., Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 244-45
(1933).
50E.g., Aris-Isotoner Gloves, Inc. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 969
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying clean hands doctrine to bar defendant's equitable defense of laches). But see Pierce v. Heritage Props., 688 So. 2d 1385, 1391 (Miss.
1997) (implying that the clean hands doctrine could apply to the defendants had
they been guilty of misconduct). This does not mean, however, that only plaintiffs or counterclaimants will be negatively impacted by the clean hands doctrine.
Rather, the doctrine allows the court to deny equity to one who has not acted
equitably in the matter and, therefore, can apply to a claimant bringing an equitable claim or a defendant asserting an equitable defense. See, e.g., Fayemi v.
Hambrecht & Quist, Inc,, 174 F.R.D. 319, 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("The final issue is
whether the Court should withhold any sanction because of the defendants' own
misconduct. Because the relief sought by the defendant is equitable, the unclean
hands doctrine applies."); Aris-Isotoner, 792 F. Supp. at 972 n.7 ("We further disagree with Berkshire's argument that the doctrine of unclean hands especially applies to plaintiffs, as opposed to defendants. The cases that Berkshire cites do
not state that a distinction exists as to the application of the unclean hands doctrine to equitable causes of action on the one hand and to equitable defenses on
the other, and such a distinction is needlessly artificial and unwarranted under
these circumstances.").
49
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the case. 5 ' Rather, the conduct of the party seeking relief and
its effect on the judicial process is the sole consideration.52
As suggested above, one requirement of the clean hands doctrine is that the misconduct bear a substantial relationship to
the matter(s) in issue: For example, in Pierce v. Heritage,5 4 the
Supreme Court of Mississippi explained:
Courts apply the maxim requiring "clean hands" only where
some unconscionable act of one coming for relief has immediate
and necessary relation to the equity that he seeks in respect of
the matter in litigation. They do not close their doors because of
plaintiffs misconduct, whatever its character, that has no relation
to anything involved in the suit, but only for such violations of
conscience as in some measure affect the equitable relations be-

tween the parties in respect of something brought before the
court for adjudication.5 "

Moreover, some courts have recognized that the misconduct
may relate to only a portion of the case and that only those
claims or defenses that are tainted need be dismissed. 5 ' Thus,
the federal judge in Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., after finding that
the pilot's hands were unclean with respect to a matter at issue
in the lawsuit,5" exercised his discretion and dismissed the claim
for lost earnings but not the entire complaint of the plaintiffpilot who lied about his past income and his failure to file tax
51E.g., Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Main. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
815 (1945) (suggesting that the conduct of the opposing party is not relevant);
Alcatel USA, Inc. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 166 F.3d 772, 794 n.92 (5th Cir. 1999);
United Cities Gas Co. v. Brock Exploration Co., 995 F. Supp. 1284, 1296 n.Il (D.
Kan. 1998).
52 E.g., Mas v. Coca-Cola Co., 163 F.2d 505, 510-11 (4th Cir. 1947).
53 E.g., Gidatex, S.r.L. v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 126, 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Estate of Lennon v. Screen Creations, Ltd., 939 F. Supp.
287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
5, 688 So. 2d 1385, 1391 (Miss. 1997).
55 Id. at 1391 (quoting Keystone Driller, 290 U.S. at 245).
56 E.g., Belmont Labs. v. Heist, 151 A. 15, 19 (Pa. 1930); Comstock v. Thompson, 133 A. 638, 640 (Pa. 1926); Barnes v. Barnes, 118 N.E. 1004, 1005 (II. 1918);
Munn & Co. v. Americana Co., 91 A. 87, 88 (NJ. 1914).
57 "[The pilot] has filed suit, seeking damages resulting from the crash of his
plane. As part of those damages, he seeks compensation for the income he lost
while recuperating from his injuries. His tax returns are critical to allowing the
defendants to assess accurately their potential liability for these damages. By providing the defendants with tax documents that were admittedly false, and by lying
in his deposition and answers to interrogatories, [he] has abused the discovery
system and has deprived the defendants of essential information." Smith v.
Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 107 (D. Md. 1989).
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returns with the Internal Revenue Service.58 Likewise, a relatively trivial misrepresentation (such as a lie about having completed college by a personal injury plaintiff whose lost earnings
claim is predicated on the salary he was earning at the time of
injury) will not usually lead to a successful invocation of the
clean hands doctrine, although a plaintiff who falsely denied in
deposition ever having been convicted of a crime found herself
out of court.59
Traditionally an equitable defense, the clean hands doctrine
has been applied to cases at law since the merger of law and
equity." As a practical matter, the fraud on the court doctrine
is sufficiently developed and, in this context, sufficiently similar
to the clean hands doctrine that the clean hands doctrine can
be left to its traditional application to equity. Therefore, it may
be sensible to rely on the clean hands doctrine only in situations
of fraud on the court by litigants asserting equitable claims or
defenses.
The standard exposition of the clean hands doctrine speaks of
the requirement of coming into court with clean hands, but
many courts also require that hands remain clean during the
litigation.6 ' Thus, a plaintiff who arrives in court with clean
hands may still find herself out of court if her hands become
soiled during the litigation.62 As one trial court explained: "It
would be strange if a court of equity had power-because of public policy for its own protection-to throw out a case because it
58 Id. ("[T] he validity of the tax documents relates only to the issue of damages
for lost income."). Judge Smalkin noted that the pilot's misconduct had begun
years earlier when he failed to file income tax returns but that such failure did
not relate directly to the lawsuit. Id. at 107 n.3. Other courts faced with similar
misconduct have dismissed the entire case. See, eg., Derzack v. Allegheny County,
173 F.R.D. 400 (W.D. Pa. 1996).
59 Rodriguez v. M & M/Mars, No. 96 C 1231, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9036 (N.D.
Ill. June 18, 1997) (relying on inherent powers to dismiss sexual harassment case
for plaintiffs attempt to "conceal relevant information bearing directly upon her
credibility").
60 E.g., Tempo Music, Inc. v. Myers, 407 F.2d 503, 507 n.8 (4th Cir. 1969); Mas,
198 F.2d at 381; Cessna Aircraft, 124 F.R.D. at 106; Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F. Supp. 242, 245 (D.S.C. 1981);
Cummings v. Wayne County, 533 N.W.2d 13, 14 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995).
61 E.g., Mas, 163 F.2d at 508.
62 E.g., Aris-Isotoner Gloves, Inc. v. Berkshire Fashions, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 969,
972 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Am. Ins. Co. v. Lucas, 38 F. Supp. 896, 921-22 (W.D.
Mo. 1940), affd sub nom., Am. Ins. Co. v.Scheufler, 129 F.2d 143 (8th Cir 1942));
Cessna Aircraft, 124 F.R.D. at 106-7; C.C.S. Communication Control, Inc. v. Sklar,
No. 86-7191, 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4280 (S.D.N.Y. June 1, 1987), affd without op.,
983 F.2d 1048 (2d Cir. 1992).
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entered with unclean hands and yet would have no power to act
if the unconscionable conduct occurred while the case was in
3
court."

6

IV.

EXAMPLES OF CONDUCT THAT HAS LED TO
DISMISSAL OR DEFAULT

Reported cases provide a broad range of examples of how not
to behave as a litigant. As the First Circuit stated in Aoude v.
Mobil Oil Corp.: "Because corrupt intent knows no stylistic
boundaries, fraud on the court can take many forms."64 Some
of the more creative or interesting forms are discussed in the
examples below:
" A supermarket slip-and-fall plaintiff who was employed by
the insurance company that administered her claim against
the supermarket accessed the insurer's computerized file,
which contained defense counsel's work product. The
court dismissed plaintiffs complaint, finding essentially
that plaintiff's conduct constituted an underhanded violation of the work product rule."5
* A plaintiff who claimed to have been injured when a cargo
jet crashed in Ecuador submitted altered medical records.
The dates had been changed so that, rather than showing
treatment one year before the crash, they reflected treatment at the time of the crash. Despite the absence of evidence of who altered the records, the court found that
utilization of the altered records constituted fraud on the
court and dismissed the case.66
63 Lucas, 38 F. Supp. at 921 ("It would be as fantastic as to think that a householder could eject one who entered his house to steal the family silverware but
could not eject a guest who entered innocently but whom he caught later stealing
the silverware.").
64 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989).
(5
Elliott v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., No. 93-304, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS
853 (Jan. 19, 1995) ("[Plaintiff] did not seek to make the required showings of
substantial need and undue hardship pursuant to MAss. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3)
before obtaining discovery of the documents..."). See also Perna v. Elec. Data
Sys. Corp., 916 F. Supp. 388 (D.NJ. 1995) (involving a litigant who photocopied
the contents of opposing counsel's briefcase when left in his office); Lipin v.
Bender, 644 N.E.2d 1300 (N.Y. 1994) (involving a plaintiff who surreptitiously
removed papers from opposing counsel's table during a pretrial conference). A
case involving similar misconduct but a different outcome is Fayemi v. Hambrecht
& Quist, Inc., 174 F.R.D. 319, 324-26 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
66 Joza v. Million Air, Inc., No. 96-3165, slip op. (S.D. Fla. May 31, 2001).
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" A corporate defendant and counterclaimant that withheld
relevant documents from production until three months
before trial on a false claim that they had been destroyed in
a fire suffered dismissal of its counterclaim.67
" Plaintiff and her husband, previously employed as a maid
and butler by a corporate defendant, brought sexual harassment, retaliatory discharge, and a variety of related state law
claims. Plaintiff testified in deposition that the individual
defendant, in whose suite in the Waldorf-Astoria plaintiff
had worked, had given her a pair of panties in September
of 1992. The plaintiff at her deposition produced the panties. Through painstaking investigation, the defendants
were able to show that the panties were first sold in November of 1993, that they were sold in the United States exclusively in Target stores, and that plaintiff had stolen several
pairs of panties from a Target store near her residence
shortly before her deposition. The court,
relying on its in68
complaint.
the
dismissed
herent power,
" Plaintiff in a sexual harassment case testified that the original of a handwritten note that said, "Carol, you 'feel' good!
Danny," was left on her desk at work. After an evidentiary
hearing that included expert testimony that the document
was a "cut and paste" job and could never have existed as an
"original," the court dismissed the complaint with
prejudice.69

* In a racial discrimination case, plaintiff presented a diary in
which he claimed he had contemporaneously recorded
events that reflected discrimination in his workplace. The
days of the week and the dates, however, frequently did not
align given the year in which the events were alleged to
have taken place. Concluding that plaintiff had fabricated
evidence and committed perjury, the court dismissed the
complaint.
"

711

In advancing an insurance coverage claim for the value of a
thoroughbred racehorse, the insured created, or caused

67 Anheuser-Bush, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 151 F.R.D. 346 (N.D. Cal.
1993). See also Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indust. Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 591 (9th Cir.
1983).
68 Vargas v. Peltz, 901 F. Supp. 1572 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
69 Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 138 F.R.D. 675 (W.D. Mo. 1990), aff'd in part,
vacated in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1992).
70 McDowell v. Seaboard Farms of Athens, Inc., No. 95-609-CIV-ORL-19, 1996
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19558, at *23-24 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 1996).
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others to create, documents used to support the claimed
valuation of the deceased horse. Some of these documents
were letters of offer to buy a share of the horse. The documents were dated before the death of the horse even
though they were prepared after the horse had died:
There is now no question but that all ten letters had been
backdated to make it appear to the Court that these
prominent and knowledgeable horsemen had expressed
themselves before the horse died. True, they may have
made oral offers before the horse died but it is now a fact
that the opinions expressed in the letters came after [the
horse] died. The credibility of these "offers" to buy a
share for $75,000, after the fact became highly questionable. Talk is cheap, they say ....
We were all misled.7 '
V. SOURCES OF AUTHORITY
Courts that have dismissed or defaulted litigants for fraud on
the court or for unclean hands have found the necessary authority inherent, in the rules of civil procedure, or both. Rules
among the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that have been cited
include Rules 11, 16, 26, 37, and 41.
A.

INHERENT POWERS

Trial courts have inherent power to sanction parties who engage in bad faith conduct that abuses the judicial process.72 The
First Circuit has said:
It is apodictic that federal courts possess plenary authority 'to
manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases'.

. .

. Courts cannot lack the power to

defend their integrity against unscrupulous marauders; if that
were so, it would place at risk the very fundament of the judicial
system.

3

71 Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F. Supp. 1267, 1273 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
72 E.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991); Link v. Wabash R.R. Co.,
370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); Zaldivar v. Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 830 (9th Cir.
1986); Vargas v. Peltz, 901 F. Supp. 1572, 1579 (S.D. Fla. 1995). See also HazelAtlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944) (addressing the inherent power of a circuit court of appeals).
7-3Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1119 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Link,
370 U.S. at 630-631).
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In Link v. Wabash Railroad Co.,74 the Supreme Court upheld the
exercise of inherent power to dismiss a civil action for failure to
prosecute. Link therefore shows that inherent powers are sufficiently potent to terminate litigation regardless of the merit of
the substantive claims.7 5 It seems only logical that trial courts
also have inherent power to dismiss for misconduct sufficiently
egregious to constitute fraud on the court.
In Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 6 the Supreme Court considered a
trial court's imposition of attorneys' fees as a sanction for a
broad range of bad faith conduct in litigation over a contract for
the sale of a Louisiana television station. The issue in the Supreme Court was whether it was permissible for the trial court to
rely on inherent powers when at least some of the conduct was
sanctionable under various federal rules or 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
which allows a court to require counsel who unreasonably multi-

ply proceedings to bear the marginal

CoStS. 7 7

The Court began

with an explanation of the basis for inherent powers:
It has long been understood that "certain implied powers must
necessarily result to our Courts ofjustice from the nature of their
institution," powers "which cannot be dispensed with in a Court,
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others." For this
reason, "Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be
vested, by their very creation, with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their
lawful mandates." These powers are "governed not by rule or
statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage
their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
Prior cases have outlined the scope of the inherent power of the
federal courts. For example, the Court has held that a federal
court has the power to control admission to its bar and to discipline attorneys who appear before it. While this power "ought to
be exercised with great caution," it is nevertheless "incidental to
all Courts."78
The Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the sanctions
under inherent powers:
74

370 U.S. 626 (1962).

Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980).
501 U.S. 32 (1991).
7 Roadway Express contains an interesting history of § 1927, which was originally enacted in 1813 and may have been prompted by the practices of United
States Attorneys, some of who were paid on a piece-work basis. Roadway Express,
447 U.S. at 759.
78 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43 (citations onitted).
75
76
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We discern no basis for holding that the sanctioning scheme of
the statute and the rules displaces the inherent power to impose
sanctions for the bad-faith conduct described above. These
other mechanisms, taken alone or together, are not substitutes
for the inherent power, for that power is both broader and narrower than other means of imposing sanctions. First, whereas
each of the other mechanisms reaches only certain individuals or
conduct, the inherent power extends to a full range of litigation
abuses. At the very least, the inherent power must continue to
exist to fill in the interstices. 7
The majority recognized that Congress could limit the exercise of inherent powers but expressed the opinion that neither
Rule 11 nor Rule 26 had such effect.8 ° One area in which the
dissenters and the majority disagreed was with respect to the
ability of a court to rely on inherent powers where the conduct
was sanctionable under a rule or statute.8 1 Thus, even the dissenters agreed that a trial court's inherent powers could be relied upon to sanction bad-faith misconduct not governed by
rules or statutes.8 2 But the majority went one step further:
There is, therefore, nothing in the other sanctioning mechanisms or prior cases interpreting them that warrants a conclusion
that a federal court may not, as a matter of law, resort to its inherent power to impose attorney's fees as a sanction for bad-faith
conduct. This is plainly the case where the conduct at issue is
not covered by one of the other sanctioning provisions. But
neither is a federal court forbidden to sanction bad-faith conduct
by means of the inherent power simply because that conduct
could also be sanctioned under the statute or the Rules. A court
must, of course, exercise caution in invoking its inherent power,
and it must comply with the mandates of due process, both in
determining that the requisite bad faith exists and in assessing
fees. Furthermore, when there is bad-faith conduct in the course
of litigation that could be adequately sanctioned under the
Rules, the court ordinarily should rely on the Rules rather than
the inherent power. But if in the informed discretion of the
court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the
court may safely rely on its inherent power.8 3
Thus, despite what perhaps should be viewed as a preference
to use applicable rules and statutes, under Chambers federal trial
Id. at 46.
80 Id. at 47-51.
81 Id. at 60.
79

82

Id. at 66.

8. Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
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courts have discretion to invoke their inherent power to mete
out sanctions in response to bad faith misconduct in matters
pending before them.
Courts that dismiss or default for fraud practiced on the court
often cite their inherent powers as a source of sanctioning authority.8 4 Perhaps this is because there is not a tight fit between
the rules of civil procedure and situations in which litigants repeatedly lie under oath, fabricate evidence to support their
claims, or destroy evidence." "The federal case law is well established that dismissal is the appropriate sanction where a party
manufactures evidence which purports to corroborate its sub6
stantive claims.

8

So, for example, the First Circuit in Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp.
affirmed dismissal of two suits that Aoude had brought on the
same cause of action, the first supported by fabricated evidence
attached to his complaint.87 After a co-conspirator was deposed,
"the truth began to emerge," and Aoude was confronted with
the co-conspirator's testimony. 8 Only then did Aoude admit his
fraudulent scheme, and it took him almost three months thereafter to bring a motion to amend his complaint to substitute an
authentic document for the fabricated one originally attached. 9
The First Circuit did not concern itself with the source of authority on which the trial court had dismissed Aoude's lawsuits:
Exercising great circumspection, the court below suggested several sources from which it derived authority to enter the dismissal orders. We are not similarly inclined. It strikes us as
elementary that a federal district court possesses the inherent
84 E.g., Brady v. United States, 877 F. Supp. 444 (C.D. 11. 1994); Sun World,
Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390 (E.D. Cal. 1992); Eppes v.
Snowden, 656 F. Supp. 1267, 1279 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
85 E.g., TeleVideo Sys. Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1987); McDowell v. Seaboard Farms of Athens, Inc., No. 95-609-CIV-ORL-19, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19558 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 1996) (fabrication of evidence); Vargas, 901 F.
Supp. at 1581 (fabrication of evidence); ABC Home Health Serv. Inc. v. Int'l Bus.
Mach. Corp., 158 F.R.D. 180 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (evidence destroyed prior to initiation of lawsuit); O'Vahey v. Miller, 644 So. 2d 550 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (personal injury plaintiff repeatedly lied under oath about education and
background); Vaughn v. Tex. Employment Comm'n, 792 S.W.2d 139 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, no writ) (wrongful discharge when plaintiff lied
under oath).
86 Vargas, 901 F. Supp. at 1581.
87 Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1116-1117, 1122 (1st Cir. 1989).
88 Id. at 1117.

89 Id.
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power to deny the court's processes to one who defiles the judicial system by committing a fraud on the court.9"
In its sole reference to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court said: "The Civil Rules neither completely describe nor
purport to delimit, the district court's powers." 9 1 Yet, other authorities continue to suggest that the courts' inherent powers
may only be utilized to respond to misconduct not addressed by
statutory enactments or rules of court. For example, Professor

Moore writes, "When an appropriate sanction for a specific
abuse exists under the Rules . . . , a court may not resort to its
inherent sanctioning power but must use the sanctions available
under the Rules. ' 92 Nonetheless, it is beyond question that
many fraud on the court scenarios are not governed by the
rules.
For example, "wrongful destruction of documents or other
physical evidence prior to the commencement of an action is

generally outside the scope of the sanctions available under specific Rules."9 3 Further, "the fabrication of evidence or testimony
is subject to the court's inherent sanctioning power and dismissal is a potential sanction."9 4 In these situations, federal trial
courts clearly are authorized to invoke their inherent power to
sanction recalcitrant litigants.
911Id. at 1118. Aoude was decided before the Supreme Court decided Chambers.
91 Id. at 1119 (citing HMG Prop. Invs., Inc. v. Parque Indust. Rio Canas, Inc.,
847 F.2d 908, 915 (1st Cir. 1988); Brockton Sav. Bank v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co., 771 F.2d 5, 11 (1st Cir. 1985)).
92 6JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
26.06[1] (Matthew
Bender 3d ed. 2000) (citing Societe Int'l Pour Participations Indus. et Comm'l,
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 207 (1958); Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d
1243, 1259 n.103 (D.C. Cir. 1981), vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 1118 (1982)).
In Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by
resorting to inherent powers and Rule 41(b), instead of Rule 37(b) (2) (iii), for
authority to dismiss a case because of plaintiffs noncompliance with a discovery
order. 357 U.S. at 207. The Chambers majority opinion distinguished Societe Internationale on the basis that there was "no need" in Societe Internationaleto invoke
inherent powers or Rule 41(b) and that where "individual rules address specific
problems... it might be improper to invoke one when another directly applies."
Chambers, 501 U.S. at 49 n.14.
93 MOORE, supra note 92, at
26.06[1]. Accord 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET
AL., WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:

Civil § 2282

(2d ed. 1994) ("[T]hough the Supreme Court said that Rule 37 is the sole source
of sanctions for the discovery violations described in that rule, there are some
violations of the discovery rules not within the compass of Rule 37, and it should
be held that the court has inherent power to deal with these violations.").
94 Id. (citing Pope, 974 F.2d at 984; Vargas, 901 F. Supp. at 1579).
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The advisory committee's notes to the 1993 amendments to
Rule 11 set forth the position that appears to have been taken by
the Supreme Court in Chambers.
Rule 11 is not the exclusive source for control of improper
presentations of claims, defenses, or contentions. It does not
supplant statutes permitting awards of attorney's fees to prevailing parties or alter the principles governing such awards. It does
not inhibit the court in punishing for contempt, in exercising its
inherent powers, or in imposing sanctions, awarding expenses,
or directing remedial action authorized under other rules or
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See [Chambers]. Chambers cautions, however, against reliance upon inherent powers if appropriate sanctions can be imposed under provisions such as Rule 11, and the
procedures specified in Rule 11-notice, opportunity to respond,
and findings-should ordinarily be employed when imposing a
sanction under the court's inherent powers.95
The question, then, in deciding whether inherent powers
properly should be invoked is whether the specific set of facts
constituting fraud on the court is adequately addressed by a rule
of civil procedure.9 6 It is unclear how tight the fit of the facts to
the rule must be before inherent powers should not be relied
upon. 7 Accordingly, counsel defending a party charged with
Advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment of Rule 11.
In Derzack v. County of Allegheny, the court relied on inherent powers to dismiss for misconduct that included fabrication of evidence.
[B]ecause it occurred throughout several aspects of this litigation
which are not squarely covered by any one rule, the Court holds, as
have most federal courts faced with similar abuse, that plaintiffs'
misconduct most directly implicates the inherent power of the
court to curb such excesses and, just as clearly, warrants invocation
of that power to sanction the responsible parties.
173 F.R.D. 400, 412 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (footnote and citations omitted).
97 Compare Societe Internationale,357 U.S. at 207
([W]hether a court has power to dismiss a complaint because of
noncompliance with a production order depends exclusively upon
Rule 37, which addresses itself with particularity to the consequences of a failure to make discovery by listing a variety of remedies which a court may employ as well as by authorizing any order
which is 'just.' There is no need to resort to Rule 41(b), which
appears in the part of the Rules concerned with trials and which
lacks such specific references to discovery.)
with Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50. A fair synthesis of these two cases, and one supported by the advisory committee's notes to the 1993 amendment of Rule 11, is
that federal trial courts have the judicial power to invoke inherent powers even
when a rule or statute covers the misconduct at issue (absent a clear congressional intent to the contrary) but that the proper exercise of discretion will usually lead to reliance on a directly applicable rule or statute.
95

96
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fraud on the court may want to argue that a rule that appears to
fit the misconduct applies if it authorizes a maximum sanction
short of default or dismissal.
Because inherent powers can be so potent, the Supreme
Court has required that they be exercised with restraint and
discretion.98
B.

RULE

11

In certain instances, Rule 11 may apply to fraud on the

court."9 While some courts have relied on their inherent powers

to dismiss or default a litigant for committing fraud on the court
and have imposed monetary sanctions under the authority of
Rule 11 as well,100 other courts have premised dismissal or default directly on Rule 11. '1 This latter use of Rule 11 appears
justified by the text of the Rule 0 2 in those situations where
pleadings, motions, or other papers filed with the court con98 Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44; Roadway Express, 447 U.S. at 764.
99 E.g., R.B. Ventures, Ltd. v. Shane, No. 91-CIV-5678, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10170 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (citing Bower v. Weisman, 674 F. Supp. 109, 112
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
100 Eg., Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F. Supp. 1267, 1281-82 (E.D. Ky. 1986) ("The
remedy must be sufficient to serve universal notice that this conduct will not be
tolerated. The remedy therefore must go further than a dismissal of the counterclaim ....
What sanctions then, could be imposed that would impress a gentleman who would pay $2,000,000.00 for a horse ....
His net worth is into seven
figures. A penalty of $194,131.52, when compared to his net worth, would
amount to something just under a 'tithe."').
101E.g., Combs v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 927 F.2d 486 (9th Cir. 1991) (relying
on Rule 11 where counsel made 36 changes on deposition errata sheet after client advised that transcript was accurate and testimony correct); Sun World, Inc.
v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 389-90 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
102 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 provides:
Rule 1. Signing of Pleadings, Motions, and Other Papers; Representations to Court; Sanctions
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper
shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name, or, if the party is not represented by an attorney,
shall be signed by the party. Each paper shall state the signer's
address and telephone number, if any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified
or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned paper shall be stricken
unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being
called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether
by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is
certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge, information,
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and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to
harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary
support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary
support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or
discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack
of information or belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated,
the court may, subject to the conditions stated below, impose an
appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that
have violated subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be
made separately from other motions or requests and shall describe
the specific conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be
served as provided in Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or
presented to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the
motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is
not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable
expenses and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing
the motion. Absent exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be
held jointly responsible for violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B) On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may
enter an order describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing an attorney, law firm, or party to
show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b) with respect
thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated. Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B),
the sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary
nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or, if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order directing pay-
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tain-or incorporate-fraudulent materials or information.,"3
For example, where a litigant attaches fabricated evidence to a
complaint or answer, it would appear an appropriate use of Rule
11 to strike the offensive pleading (which could have the effect
of putting the misbehaving litigant out of court). 0 4 Some authorities, however, believe that dismissal is not a sanction available under Rule 11.105
In Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria1 6 the defendant attached to a brief opposing a motion an altered contract (entitled Notice of Termination), which-if authentic-would have
allowed the defendant to avoid liability. He also swore to the
authenticity of the Notice of Termination in two affidavits filed
with the court. The court did not hesitate to apply Rule 11 to
the situation:
ment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees
and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a represented
party for a violation of subdivision (b) (2).
(B) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or settlement of the claims made by or against the
party which is, or whose attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the
conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of
this rule do not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and motions that are subject to the provisions
of Rules 26 through 37.
103 FED. R. Ctv. P. 11(a) (1997)
("Every pleading, written motion, and other
paper..."); Id. 11(c) (2) ("[T]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of
a nonmonetary nature .. ."); advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendments
("The court has available a variety of possible sanctions to impose for violations,
such as striking the offending paper ....").Numerous courts, however, appear
to stretch Rule 11 to address circumstances not clearly encompassed by the text
of the rule. For example, in Bower v. Weisman, 674 F. Supp. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y.
1987), Judge Sweet held that a witness' review of and signature on a deposition
transcript brought perjury during the deposition within the scope of Rule 11.
104 This was the scenario in the first suit filed against Mobil Oil Corporation in
Aoude. The First Circuit, however, relied on the trial court's inherent powers in
affirming dismissal of the complaint. Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115
(1st Cir. 1989).
105 E.g., Hutchinson v. Hensley Flying Serv., No. 98-35361, 2000 U.S. App.
LEXIS 402, at *6-13 (9th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000) (dissenting opinion); Wyle v. R.J.
Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 593 (9th Cir. 1983) (implying that striking of
pleading, but not dismissal, is authorized under Rule 11).
106 144 F.R.D. 384 (E.D. Cal. 1992).
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Application of Rule 11 to these facts is exceedingly simple.
Lizarazu admittedly and intentionally defrauded the court by filing the Notice of Termination. He also committed perjury in at
least two instances in furtherance of that fraud. Consequently, to
say that the Notice of Termination and the two perjured documents were not well grounded in fact is a gross understatement.
•..
[T]he court finds that the only appropriate sanction is the
striking of Lizarazu's answer, the dismissal of his counterclaim
and the entry of default judgment against him on Sun World's
complaint. Lizarazu's egregious conduct, his lack of repentance
and his obvious disregard for this court's authority force the conclusion that no other sanction would be efficacious. Accordingly,
pursuant to Rule 11, the court hereby strikes Lizarazu's answer,
dismisses his counterclaim, orders the entry of default judgment
for Sun World, and orders Lizarazu to pay all costs and attorney's
fees incurred by Sun World
resulting from and relating to the
07
fraudulent document. 1

While some might argue that the Rule 11 violation stems from
the signing of the pleading, motion, or other paper and that,
therefore, only the attorney is subject to sanction, 10 8 the Rule
provides for sanctions against the person "responsible for the
violation."1'9
C.

RULE

16

Rule 16 deals with pretrial conferences and scheduling management. 11 0 As such, it is not likely to be, and generally has not
been, a source of authority for responding to fraud on the
court. Nonetheless, because it contains a sanctions subdiviId. at 389-90.
108 See, e.g., Lony v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 935 F.2d 604, 617 n.4 (3d
Cir. 1991) (citing Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enter., Inc.,
498 U.S. 533 (1991)).
109 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). See also advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment ("Even though it is the attorney whose signature violates the rule, it may be
appropriate under the circumstances of the case to impose a sanction on the
client. See Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560 F.2d 1078
(2d Cir. 1977). This modification brings Rule 11 in line with practice under Rule
37, which allows sanctions for abuses during discovery to be imposed upon the
party, the attorney, or both."); 5A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
WRIGHT, MILLER & MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: Civil § 1336 (2d
ed. 2000 Supp.) ("[T]his view [(i.e., that only the attorney is subject to sanction)]
appears erroneous in light of the plain wording of Rule 11, which expressly allows
sanctions to be imposed on the client as well as the signing attorney.").
"10 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
107

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

1276

sion, l"' which provides for sanctions for failure to obey a scheduling or pretrial order, it can respond to some situations
involving fraud on the court. In one such case, plaintiff failed to
obey a pair of pretrial orders calling for the plaintiff to account
for the pre-trial destruction of relevant documents. Although
the court, in dismissing, relied on its inherent powers, it noted
that dismissal would also be justified under Rule 16(f). 1 2
D.

RULE 26

Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the general
provision addressing discovery, including such things as the
scope of discovery, supplementation obligations, and the work
product rule." 3 Since 1983, the Rule has contained a Rule 11
equivalent applicable to discovery papers." 4 Rule 26(g) provides in part as follows:
(2) Every discovery request, response, or objection made by a
party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
whose address shall be stated. An unrepresented party shall
sign the request, response, or objection and state the party's
address. The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a
certification that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, the request, response, or objection is:
(A) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law
or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law;
(B) not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the
cost of litigation; and
(C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive,
given the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the
case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the litigation....
(3) If without substantial justification a certification is made in
violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who made the certification, the party on whose behalf the disclosure, request,
"'

112

FED. R. Civ. P. 16(f).
Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F. Supp. 967, 975-76 (D.D.C. 1984).

113 FED.
14 FED.

R. Civ. P. 26.

R. Civ. P. 26(g). See also advisory committee's notes to 1983 amendment to Rule 26.
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response, or objection is made, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred because of the violation, including a reasonable attorney's fee.' 15
Accordingly, fraudulent responses to written discovery may violate Rule 26(g) (2) (B) and expose a party to default or dismissal much like fraudulent pleadings might do so under Rule
11.116 More often, however, Rule 26(g) is used to mete out
monetary sanctions to combat discovery abuses of a more traditional variety.' 17
One court that used Rule 26 to support dismissal grounded
the sanction on a violation of Massachusetts's Rule 26(b) (3), the
work product rule. In Elliott v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc.," 8 the
court apparently relied on its inherent power for the dismissal
sanction. The plaintiff was employed by an insurer hired to investigate, evaluate, and attempt to settle her claim. She took advantage of her access to the employer's computer system and
reviewed defense counsel's impressions of the case, trial plans,
evaluations of the evidence, settlement recommendations, and
other work product. Against plaintiffs argument that she had
neither submitted falsified evidence nor offered false testimony,
the court found the conduct a violation of the work product
rule and that putting the plaintiff out of court could only right
the process.1 19
E.

RULE

37

Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is a common
source of sanctions for discovery abuse. 120 In the right set of
115
116

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g).

See supra note 103.

E.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1545 (11th Cir. 1993).
118No. 93-304, 1995 Mass. Super. LEXIS 853 (Jan. 19, 1995).
119 Id. at *6-9.
120 FED. R. Civ. P. 37 provides:
Rule 37. Failure to Make Disclosure or Cooperate in Discovery:
Sanctions
117

(a) Motion For Order Compelling Disclosure or Discovery. A
party, upon reasonable notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order compelling disclosure or
discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate Court. An application for an order to a party shall
be made to the court in which the action is pending. An application for an order to a person who is not a party shall be made to the
court in the district where the discovery is being, or is to be, taken.
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(2) Motion.
(A) If a party fails to make a disclosure required by Rule 26(a), any
other party may move to compel disclosure and for appropriate
sanctions. The motion must include a certification that the movant
has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party
not making the disclosure in an effort to secure the disclosure without court action.
(B) If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or submitted under Rules 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b) (6) or 31 (a), or a party fails to
answer an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails
to respond that inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to
permit inspection as requested, the discovering party may move for
an order compelling an answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance with the request. The motion
must include a certification that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party failing to
make the discovery in an effort to secure the information or material without court action. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the proponent of the question may complete or adjourn
the examination before applying for an order.
(3) Evasive or Incomplete Disclosure, Answer, or Response. For
purposes of this subdivision an evasive or incomplete disclosure,
answer, or response is to be treated as a failure to disclose, answer,
or respond.
(4) Expenses and Sanctions.
(A) If the motion is granted or if the disclosure or requested discovery is provided after the motion was filed, the court shall, after
affording an opportunity to be heard, require the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such conduct or both of them to pay to the moving
party the reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds that the motion was
filed without the movant's first making a good faith effort to obtain
the disclosure or discovery without court action, or that the opposing party's nondisclosure, response, or objection was substantially
justified, or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust.
(B) If the motion is denied, the court may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and shall, after affording an opportunity to be heard, require the moving party or the attorney
filing the motion or both of them to pay to the party or deponent
who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney's fees, unless the court finds
that the making of the motion was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(C) If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court
may enter any protective order authorized under Rule 26(c) and
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may, after affording an opportunity to be heard, apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion among the
parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure To Comply With Order.
(1) Sanctions by Court in District Where Deposition Is Taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is
being taken, the failure may be considered a contempt of that
court.
(2) Sanctions by Court in Which Action Is Pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated tinder Rule 30(b) (6) or 31 (a) to testify on behalf of a party
fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an
order made under subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a
party fails to obey an order entered under Rule 26(f), the court in
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the
failure as are just, and among others the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for
the purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party
obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting that party
from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action
or proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto,
an order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any
orders except an order to submit to a physical or mental
examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring that party to produce another for examination,
such orders as are listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this
subdivision, unless the party failing to comply shows that that party
is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the
court shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the court finds
that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
(c) Failure to Disclose; False or Misleading Disclosure; Refusal to
Admit.
(1) A party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) or 26(e) (1) shall not, unless such
failure is harmless, be permitted to use as evidence at a trial, at a
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circumstances, Rule 37 is sufficiently potent to support dismissal
hearing, or on a motion any witness or information not so disclosed. In addition to or in lieu of this sanction, the court, on motion and after affording an opportunity to be heard, may impose
other appropriate sanctions. In addition to requiring payment of
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, these sanctions may include any of the actions authorized
under subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this
rule and may include informing the jury of the failure to make the
disclosure.
(2) If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the
truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if the party
requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, the requesting party may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to pay the
reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it
finds that (A) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule
36(a), or (B) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (C) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to
believe that the party might prevail on the matter, or (D) there was
other good reason for the failure to admit.

(d) Failure of Party to Attend at Own Deposition or Serve Answers
to Interrogatories or Respond to Request for Inspection. If a party
or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person
designated under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a
party fails (1) to appear before the officer who is to take the deposition, after being served with a proper notice, or (2) to serve answers
or objections to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33, after
proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after
proper service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are
just, and among others it may take any action authorized under
subparagraphs (A), (B), and (C) of subdivision (b)(2) of this rule.
Any motion specifying a failure under clause (2) or (3) of this subdivision shall include a certification that the movant has in good
faith conferred or attempted to confer with the party failing to answer or respond in an effort to obtain such answer or response
without court action. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto,
the court shall require the party failing to act or the attorney advising that party or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including
attorney's fees, caused by the failure unless the court finds that the
failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make
an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused
on the ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the
party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order as
provided by Rule 26(c).

(e) [Abrogated]
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of a claim or action or rendition of a judgment by default. 121 As
presently constituted, however, it does not provide a good fit for
addressing fraud on the court. With the exception of failure to
make mandatory disclosures required by Rule 26(a), to attend a
deposition, to serve answers to interrogatories, or to serve a written response to a request for inspection, sanctions provided for
by the Rule for conduct prior to entry of a court order on the subject
are limited to the reasonable expenses, including attorney's
fees, of bringing a motion to compel.122 Accordingly, counsel
representing a litigant charged with committing fraud on the
court in the context of discovery may argue that the misconduct
is nothing more than "an evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response" and, therefore, subject to Rule 37(a). 23 Such
an approach, if successful, could limit the sanction to the ex124
penses of bringing a motion to compel.
Some courts, however, have applied Rule 37(b) sanctions to
fraud on the court by employing the fiction that there was a
standing order against perjury, subornation of perjury, and the
like. For example, in Quela v. Payco-GeneralAmerican Credits, Inc.,
the trial judge wrote:
(f) [Repealed. Pub. L. 96481, Title II, § 205(a), Oct. 21, 1980, 94
Stat. 2330]
(g) Failure to Participate in the Framing of a Discovery Plan. If a
party or a party's attorney fails to participate in good faith in the
development and submission of a proposed discovery plan as required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportunity for hearing,
require such party or attorney to pay to any other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure.
121 E.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1980) ("[Rule
37(b)] permits the trial court to strike claims from the pleadings, and even to
'dismiss the action . . . or render a judgment by default against the disobedient
party.... .' Th[e] failure [to answer interrogatories after being ordered to do so]
was the immediate ground for dismissing the case ..
"); Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (11th Cir. 1993) (affirming the striking of defendants' answers and entry of default judgment pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(C) for
defendants' failure to comply with court's orders to produce documents to plaintiff); 8A WRIGHT, supra note 93, at § 2281.
122 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) (mandatory disclosures and supplementation thereof);
FED. R. Ctv. P. 37(d) (failure to attend or respond). See also Shepherd v. Am.
Broad. Cos., 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that sanction may not be
based on Rule 37(b) in absence of violation of court order, but ultimate sanction
may be based on inherent powers under certain circumstances); 8A WRIGHT,
supra note 93, at § 2282 ("The general scheme of the rule is that ordinarily sanctions can be applied only for failure to comply with an order of the court.").
123 FED. R. Clv. P. 37(a).
124 FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(4)(A).
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[A]lithough there has been no specific court order, we believe
such an order is not required to provide notice that parties must
not engage in such abusive litigation practices as coercing witness
testimony, lying to the court, and tampering with the integrity of
the judicial system. Because all litigants are presumed to know
that contumacious conduct of this sort is absolutely unacceptable, we can properly consider the sanctions available under
Rule 37.125

"The imposition of penalties under [Rule] 37(d) ...is limited
to an absolute failure to respond."' 2 6 Nonetheless, some courts
that have sanctioned litigants for perjury and fabrication of evidence have looked to Rule 37(d) as a source of sanctioning authority. 27 For example, the trial court in Pierce v. Heritage
Propertiesrelied on Rule 37 and its inherent power in dismissing
the complaint of a woman allegedly injured when a ceiling fan
fell on her leg.'12 Plaintiff was not alone at the time of her injury, but she testified that she had been (and answered an interrogatory about eyewitnesses in a similarly untruthful manner),
because she did not want her parents to know that she had a
male guest in her apartment at night. After an anonymous
caller advised defense counsel of the eyewitness and plaintiff became aware that defense counsel knew of the eyewitness, she
29
admitted that she had given false testimony.
By treating false responses to discovery as no response, as the
Pierce court suggested could be done,130 some courts that have
relied on Rule 37 for sanctioning authority have tightened the
fit that Rule 37 bears to fraud on the court.' 3 ' Nonetheless, it is
125 No. 99 C 104, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6932, at *18 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 2000)
(citations omitted).
16Orkin Exterminating Co. v. McIntosh, 452 S.E.2d 159, 162 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994) (applying the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure) (citing Mayer v. Interstate
Fire Ins. Co., 254 S.E.2d 825 (Ga. 1979)).
127E.g., Wyle v. R.J. Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 592 (9th Cir. 1983).
128 688 So. 2d 1385 (Miss. 1997) (applying Miss. R. Civ. P. 37).
129 Id. at 1388.
150The trial court in Pierce relied on Rule 37(b) (2), Rule 37(e), and inherent
powers. Id. The Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the trial court's dismissal
without stating whether the specific rules relied on by the trial court were appropriate. Id. at 1392. In discussing the issues, however, the supreme court approvingly noted that some federal courts had treated a false response as a failure to
respond under Rule 37(d). Id. at 1389.
131Orkin, 452 S.E.2d at 163 (applying the Georgia Rules of Civil Procedure);
Pierce, 688 So. 2d at 1389 (applying the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure) (citing Airtex Corp. v. Shelley Radiant Ceiling Co., 536 F.2d 145, 155 (7th Cir.
1976)); Bell v. Auto. Club of Mich., 80 F.R.D. 228 (E.D. Mich. 1978). See also
Polanski v. Detroit Police, 798 F.2d 470 (6th Cir. 1986) (apparently treating an
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unclear whether Rule 37(d) is appropriately used to respond to
false deposition testimony, untrue interrogatory responses, or
fabricated evidence produced for inspection, because (1) the
Rule expressly applies to complete failures to respond, and (2)
unlike Rule 37(a), which expressly provides that an evasive answer should be treated as a failure to respond, it does not contain a provision broadening
its applicability beyond complete
13 2
failures to respond.

Because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly
prohibit perjury, subornation of perjury, destruction of evidence, or fabrication of evidence, Rule 37-which is directed at
violations of discovery rules-often does not provide a good fit
for addressing fraud on the court. Courts that have thoughtfully
applied Rule 37 to fraud on the court have often utilized fictions
to make the rule fit the situation. Given the Supreme Court's
holding in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 3 however, it seems that
such fictions are unnecessary and that reliance on inherent powers is more appropriate in many fraud on the court scenarios.
As discussed below, Rule 41, for this reason, may also constitute
more appropriate authority for dismissing a plaintiff (but not
sanctioning a defendant) who commits fraud on the court.
F.

RULE

41

Rule 41 (b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in
part: "For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
these rules or any order of court, a defendant may move for
3 4
dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant."'
Thus, Rule 41(b) provides a basis for dismissal of a plaintiffs
claim, not default of a defendant, for non-compliance with the
rules of civil procedure or a court order. A number of courts
have relied on Rule 41(b), in addition to inherent powers, for
unwarranted assertion of Fifth Amendment rights at a deposition as a refusal to
respond to discovery under Rule 37(d) and dismissing where plaintiff previously
had committed perjury at trial that ended in mistrial).
132 Rule 37(a) includes a provision that, "[f]or purposes of this subdivision an
evasive or incomplete disclosure, answer, or response is to be treated as a failure
to disclose, answer, or respond" (emphasis added). The advisory committee's
notes to the 1970 amendment, in which this provision (a) (3) was added, explain
that "subdivision" means Rule 37(a).
133501 U.S. 32 (1991).
134 FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
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authority
to dismiss a plaintiff who has committed fraud on the
135

court.
"[N]o rule specifically prohibits fraud and perjury in discovery."'136 Nonetheless, a number of courts have concluded that a
prohibition against fraud and perjury is implicit in each rule
that requires the giving of information under oath. 137 As Judge
Smalkin explained in Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
It is true that neither Rule 30 nor Rule 33 specifically demands that answers in depositions and interrogatories be truthful. Nevertheless, each Rule's requirement that the party give
answers under oath would be thwarted if giving false answers
constituted compliance with the Rule. Thus, one court has
noted: "An implicit condition in any order to answer an interrogatory is that the answer be true, responsive and complete. A
false answer is in some ways worse than no answer; it misleads
and confuses the party." The need for truthful answers certainly
applies to depositions as well.'
Another court, reaching the same conclusion pursuant to
Rule 11, noted that the obligation to be truthful exists in all
lawsuits: "[T]he court ... need not order [a litigant] to refrain
from submitting false documents or perjuring himself in order
for those acts to be punishable by dismissal and the entry of default judgment. The legal obligation to refrain from committing such acts is imposed upon every party to a lawsuit."'3 9
The argument against application of Rule 41 (b) to fraud on
the court in the discovery context is supported by the Supreme
Court's 1958 decision in Societe InternationalePour Participations
Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers,14 ° a case that was not
overruled by Chambers. 4 ' In Societe Internationale, the Supreme
135 E.g., Pope v. Fed. Express Corp., 138 F.R.D. 675 (W.D. Mo. 1990), affd in
part, vacated in part on other grounds, 974 F.2d 982 (8th Cir. 1992); McDowell v.
Seaboard Farms of Athens, Inc., No. 95-609-CIV-ORL-19, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
19558 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 1996); Synanon Church v. United States, 579 F. Supp.
967, 975-76 (D.D.C. 1984).
136 Smith v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 124 F.R.D. 103, 108 (D. Md. 1989) (describing
defendants' concession).
137 E.g., id.
138 Id. at 108-09 (citing Evanson v. Union Oil Co., 85 F.R.D. 274, 277 (D. Minn.
1979); Hunter v. Int'l Sys. & Controls Corp., 56 F.R.D. 617, 631 (W.D. Mo.
1972)).
1"9 Sun World, Inc. v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 389-90 (E.D. Cal.
1992).
140 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
141 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 n.14 (1991).
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Court rejected reliance on Rule 41 (b) to respond to noncompliance with an order to produce documents. 142 The Court
pointed out that Rule 41 appears in a part of the Rules that
deals not with discovery but with trials. 143 As with Rule 37, application of Rule 41 (b) to fraud on the court may require use of a
fiction to make the rule fit the situation. Given the Supreme
Court's decision in Chambers, this seems unnecessary.
VI.

SANCTION SELECTION

The trial court has broad discretion in selecting an appropriate sanction.'
Nonetheless, because dismissal or default
"sounds 'the death knell of the lawsuit,' these remedies should
not lightly be invoked.' 45 Indeed, there are due process limitations on the imposition of sanctions. 146 "In calibrating the
scales, the judge should carefully balance the policy favoring adjudication on the merits with competing policies such as the
need to maintain institutional integrity and the desirability of
deterring future misconduct.' 1 47 The sanction may, however,

penalize the recalcitrant litigant as well as act as a deterrent "to
those who might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of
48
'

such a deterrent."'

Factors that are considered in selecting an appropriate sanction for fraud on the court will vary depending upon the authority on which the court relies and, in some cases, the federal
circuit or state in which the case is decided. Accordingly, the
range of considerations associated with each rule will differ and
may influence counsel's selection of authority to urge upon the
court for default or dismissal.' 49
142

Societe Internationale,357 U.S. at 207.

Id.
144 See, e.g., Cessna Aircraft, 124 F.R.D. at 109.
145 Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations
143

omitted); Bower v. Weisman, 674 F. Supp. 109, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that
court's inherent powers "must be exercised with restraint and discretion") (quoting Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980)).
146 E.g., Bower, 674 F. Supp. at 112 (citing Roadway Express 447 U.S. at 767 n.14
(1980)); 8A WRIGHT, supra note 93, at § 2283.
147 Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 (citing Nat'l Hockey League v. Metro. Hockey Club,
Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); HMG Prop. Invs. Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas,
Inc., 847 F.2d 908, 916-17 (1st Cir. 1988)).
148 National Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 643. As revised in 1993, however, Rule
11 sanctions are to be used solely for deterrence. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2); advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendment to Rule 11.
149 Counsel, whether urging-or defending against-sanctions, should research
the applicable law to determine which factors the court will likely consider with
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Factors that the courts
consider in exercising their discretion
50

include the following:

The egregiousness of the misconduct.15 ' Dismissal and default are
"extreme remed [ies]" and "such strong medicine" should be reserved "for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is
correspondingly egregious. 1 5 2 The degree of willfulness, bad

faith, or fault reflected by the misconduct, 153 or, as stated by
each source of sanctioning authority and how, in the particular jurisdiction,
those factors are likely to be weighed and balanced.
150The advisory committee's notes offer potential considerations for sanctions
selected under Rule 11. They suggest the following considerations:
The rule does not attempt to enumerate the factors a court should
consider in deciding whether to impose a sanction or what sanctions would be appropriate in the circumstances; but, for emphasis,
it does specifically note that a sanction may be nonmonetary as well
as monetary. Whether the improper conduct was willful, or negligent; whether it was part of a pattern of activity, or an isolated
event; whether it infected the entire pleading, or only one particular count or defense; whether the person has engaged in similar
conduct in other litigation; whether it was intended to injure; what
effect it had on the litigation process in time or expense; whether
the responsible person is trained in the law; what amount, given the
financial resources of the responsible person, is needed to deter
that person from repetition in the same case; what amount is
needed to deter similar activity by other litigants: all of these may in
a particular case be proper considerations. The court has significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a violation, subject to the principle that the sanctions
should not be more severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes to 1993 amendments.
151E.g., United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993); Nichols v. Klein Tools, Inc., 949 F.2d 1047, 1048 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 538 F.2d 180 (8th Cir.
1976)); Lee v. Am. Eagle Airlines, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1331 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
152 West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999);
Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., 892 F.2d 1115, 1118 (1st Cir. 1989) (citing Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962); D.P. Apparel Corp. v. Roadway Express, Inc., 736 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1984); Corchado v. P.R. Marine Mgmt., Inc.,
665 F.2d 410, 413 (1st Cir. 1981)).
153 E.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1542 (lth Cir. 1993);
Batson v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 514 (5th Cir. 1985); Wyle v. RJ.
Reynolds Indus., Inc., 709 F.2d 585, 589 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing National Hockey
League, 427 U.S. at 640; Sigliano v. Mendoza, 642 F.2d 309, 310 (9th Cir. 1981));
Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 151 F.R.D. 346, 347 (N.D. Cal.
1993) (citing Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1993));
Sun World, Inc. v. Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (citing Halaco
Eng'g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 380 (9th Cir. 1988)).
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some courts, the intentional nature of any misconduct, is a consideration in selection of an appropriate sanction."'
The extent to which there has been a pattern of misconduct. 5' Indeed, some courts have held that many individual acts of misconduct would not rise to the level of fraud on the court, but
that the pattern they evidenced was sufficient to warrant an ultimate sanction.' 56
Whether a litigant who has "come clean" has done so only after he or
she has been 'found out. ""7
For example, the Ninth Circuit in TeleVideo Systems, Inc. v.
Heidenthal,'58 wrote:
Appellant argues that a default judgment of this magnitude [over
$11 Million] was far too severe a penalty. He argues that he mitigated the harm by admitting before trial commenced that he had
perjured himself; he urges that his confession warrants some
favorable consideration and argues that this court should be lenient towards him in order not to deter future perjurers from making such admissions. In other words, appellant believes that his
belated candor should be rewarded. In some circumstances we
154 E.g., Cessna Aircraft, 124 F.R.D. at 110. Accord Batson, 765 F.2d at 514 (construing Rule 37(b) (2) (C), which applies to non-compliance with court order);
Medina v. Found. Reserve Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 125, 126 (N.M. 1994) (same). Nonetheless, ultimate sanctions (i.e., default or dismissal) may be appropriate even if
the misconduct is not intentional. E.g., Marrocco v. Gen. Motors Corp., 966 F.2d
220 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming directed verdict for plaintiff as sanction for grossly
negligent noncompliance with court order) (citing National Hockey League, 427
U.S. at 640; Societe Int'l Pour Participations Indus. et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 212 (1956)). In the context of fabricated evidence, courts are
generally not receptive to the argument that the fabricated evidence contains
truthful information. For example, the Supreme Court responded to this argument by pointing out that "Truth needs no disguise. The article, even if true,
should have stood or fallen under the only title it could honestly have been given
- that of a brief in behalf of Hartford, prepared by Hartford's agents, attorneys,
and collaborators." Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238,
247 (1944).
155E.g., Cessna Aircraft, 124 F.R.D. at 110; Wood v. Biloxi Pub. Sch. Dist., 757
So. 2d 190 (Miss. 2000) (reversing dismissal where there was not pattern of
misconduct).
156 E.g., United Bus. Communications, Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F. Supp.
1172, 1187 (D. Kan. 1984).
157 E.g., Cessna Aircraft, 124 F.R.D. at 109 ("Mr. Garner did not suddenly develop a case of cold feet; rather, he only admitted misconduct when it became
apparent to him that the IRS was about to be asked to search for nonexistent
forms."); Nakahara v. NS 1991 Am. Trust, 718 A.2d 518, 525 (Del. Ch. 1998)
(holding that post judgment contrition comes too late to merit leniency); Pierce
v. Heritage Props., 688 So. 2d 1385, 1390 (Miss. 1997).
158 826 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1987).
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might agree that lesser sanctions would be appropriate where a
defendant has admitted his falsehoods and they have not tainted
the entire pretrial process. This is not such a case.
Appellant's recantation was not motivated by a desire to repent
and set the record straight. Under questioning by the district
judge, appellant revealed that even his admission was part of his
elaborate scheme to prevail at trial. In answer to the district
judge's question as to why he testified falsely in the depositions,
appellant responded: "because I was making sure that I would
have him and Phil [Hwang] to the point where they thought they
had me by the short ones, and they would get me in here and
then, when I get in here, I am going straight and tell the truth on
everything, and his case is going to crumble apart."
Heidenthal's statement, perhaps the only candid one he makes,
reveals that his perjury and the recanting were both orchestrated
to reap a tactical advantage. To permit Heidenthal to proceed to
trial would have played into Heidenthal's hands and greatly disadvantaged the plaintiffs who had planned their strategy and developed their case to respond to Heidenthal's false evidence.15 9
The materiality of the misconduct. 6 ' Most courts will find the
misconduct material if it had the capacity to influence the litigation.'"' Actual influence is usually unnecessary because "[t]he
failure of a party's corrupt plan does not immunize the defrauder from the consequences of his misconduct."' 16 2 Where
the deception is wholly unrelated to the merits of the action, an
ultimate sanction may constitute a due process violation.' 6 3
The efficacy of lesser sanctions.64 The trial court should consider whether lesser sanctions would achieve the purposes of the
1-69Id. at 917.

160Sun World v. Lizarazu Olivarria, 144 F.R.D. 384, 390-91 (E.D. Cal. 1992)
("The court is hard put to think of any document which could be more firmly
connected to the merits of this case than this one; if accepted as genuine it would
have disposed of Sun World's case in one fell swoop."); Pope v. Fed. Express
Corp., 138 F.R.D. 675, 683 (W.D. Mo. 1990) ("The manufactured document
would have been the linchpin of plaintiffs case.").
16' Eg., Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1120 (1st Cir. 1989); Eppes v. Snowden, 656 F. Supp.
1267, 1278-79 (E.D. Ky. 1986).
162 Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1120.
163 E.g., Phoceene Sous-Marine S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc. 682 F.2d 802 (9th
Cir. 1982) (cited in Eppes, 656 F. Supp. at 1278-79). See also 8A WRIGHT, supra
note 93, at § 2283.
64 E.g., United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450 (4th Cir. 1993); Batson
v. Neal Spelce Assocs., Inc., 765 F.2d 511, 514, 516 (9th Cir. 1985); AnheuserBusch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distrib., 151 F.R.D. 346, 347 (N.D. Cal. 1993)
(citing Henry v. Gill Indus., Inc., 983 F.2d 943, 946, 948 (9th Cir. 1993)). In a
multi-party case, it may-from a tactical perspective-be wise for all parties on the
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sanction. 165 The deference that appellate courts will give to trial
courts appears, however, to vary widely.' 6" Some courts have interpreted the absence of remorse or repentance as an indication
that anything short of an ultimate sanction will not be

effective.'

7

The role that the client (as opposed to counsel) played in the misconduct. 16 ' The courts are less willing to punish with default or
dismissal when the lawyers, not the client, are responsible for
the misconduct.
The prejudice suffered by the victim of the misconduct.'"9 Where
there is significant prejudice, any sanction short of default or
dismissal may be insufficient. 7 °
side opposite the offending litigant to join together in seeking dismissal or default. In West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 167 F.3d 776, 780 n.1 (2d Cir. 1999),
the court, in reversing dismissal, noted that only one of the two defendants
sought dismissal, indicating to the court that one of the defendants "[o]bviously
• . . believed that lesser sanctions, like exclusion of spoliated evidence, would
"
protect its interests ....
165 E.g., West, 167 F.3d at 779-80 (vacating and remanding for consideration of
an effective lesser sanction, such as the use of presumptions favoring the defendants and preclusion of plaintiffs evidence, where trial court had dismissed plaintiff for spoliation of evidence in product liability action); Pope, 138 F.R.D. at 683
("Permitting this lawsuit to proceed would be an open invitation to abuse the
judicial process. Litigants would infer they have everything to gain, and nothing
to lose, if manufactured evidence merely is excluded while their lawsuit continues. Litigants must know that the courts are not open to persons who would seek
justice by fraudulent means.").
166 Compare, e.g., Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir.
1993), (deferring to trial judge's conclusion that a sanction less harsh than default would not have changed the defendants' behavior), with West, 167 F.3d at
779-80 (reversing for consideration of lesser sanctions). See also Oliver v.
Gramley, 200 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that trial court's failure to consider lesser sanctions was harmless error given egregiousness of misconduct).
167 E.g., Lee, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1331; Sun World, 144 F.R.D. at 390 ("Lizarazu's
egregious conduct, his lack of repentance and his obvious disregard for this
court's authority force the conclusion that no other sanction would be
efficacious.").
-6 E.g., Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d at 450; Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1121; Batson, 765
F.2d at 514; Pierce, 688 So. 2d at 1391.
169 E.g., Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d at 450; Batson, 765 F.2d at 514; AnheuserBusch, 151 F.R.D. at 347 (citing Gill Indus., 983 F.2d at 946, 948; Sun World, 144
F.R.D. at 390). But see Miller v. Time-Warner Communications, Inc., No. 97 Civ.
7286 (JSM), 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14512 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 22, 1999) (dismissing
case of plaintiff who intentionally erased handwritten notes to prevent the defendants from discovering them and who lied about the erasures despite the fact
that defendants were not prejudiced because erasures remained sufficiently
legible).
170 E.g., Elliott v. Shaw's Supermarkets, Inc., No. 93-304, 1995 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 853, at *6-9 (Jan. 19, 1995) (holding that the only way to remedy the
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The government or public interests at stake. 7 ' This factor calls for
a balancing of the preference for decisions on the merits with
the desire to maintain the integrity of17 the
court and provide for
2
justice.
of
administration
orderly
the
Litigants who suffer severe sanctions may be able to argue that
they should have been provided the safeguards of a criminal
trial. This argument stems from the fact that, with respect to
sanctions, "the trial court may act as accuser, fact finder and sentencingjudge, not subject to restrictions of any procedural code
and at times not limited by any rule of law governing the severity
'
of sanctions that may be imposed."173
Indeed, imposition of a
dismissal or default sanction may violate due process if the
wrongdoing does not relate to the matter in controversy (i.e.,
the misconduct must be material to the lawsuit).' 74 Nonetheless, the misconduct need not bear on the entire case; it is sufficient if the misconduct could reduce the damages that would be
awarded.1 75 Moreover, adequate notice and an opportunity to
be heard have generally been found to satisfy any due process
1 76
requirements where the misconduct is related to the merits.

situation, where plaintiff had improperly obtained the defendant's attorney's
opinion work product, was to dismiss the suit).
1E' g., Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d at 450; Sun World, 144 F.R.D. at 390.
72 E.g., Shaffer Equip., 11 F.3d at 463.
1v3 Mackler Prods., Inc. v. Cohen, 146 F.3d 126, 128 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Int'l
Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994), which addressed the issue in the context of civil contempt sanctions).
174 E.g., Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589, 591 (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694 (1982); Hammond Packing Co. v.
Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 349-54 (1909); Phoceene Sous-Marine, S.A. v. U.S. Phosmarine, Inc., 682 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir. 1982); Raiford v. Pounds, 640 F.2d 944,
945 (9th Cir. 1981); G-K Props. v. Redevelopment Agency of San Jose, 577 F.2d
645, 648 (9th Cir. 1978)). See 8A WRIGHT, supra note 93, at § 2283. In Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409 (1897), the Supreme Court held that a trial court may not
strike an answer and enter a default merely to punish a contempt that is unrelated to the merits of the case. Likewise, the Ninth Circuit in Phoceene SousMarine, S.A., held that a litigant's false statement that he was too sick to attend
trial, while meriting a severe sanction, was unrelated to the merits and therefore,
an improper basis on which to enter a default judgment. 682 F.2d at 805-6.
175 Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589, 591 (citing First Beverages, Inc. v. Royal Crown Cola
Co., 612 F.2d 1164, 1174-75 (9th Cir.1980)).
176Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1543 (finding due process requirements satisfied
where court warned that continued conduct would result in striking of answers
and entry of defaultjudgment and an evidentiary hearing was held before meting
of sanctions).
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EFFECT ON OTHER CASES - RESJUDICATA
AND THE LIKE

Several cases have addressed the situation where the party
who has acted fraudulently has become involved in related litigation. The issue then is the effect that the misconduct in or
prior to one case has on the related litigation. Two approaches
to this scenario are found in the cases.
First, some courts take the view that fraud "infects" the cause
of action, and, therefore, a subsequent attempt on the same
cause of action will fare no better than the original suit on the
same cause. Thus, in Aoude v. Mobil Oil Corp., the First Circuit
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of two related lawsuits. 17 7 In
the first, Aoude had attached to his complaint a fabricated document. In the second lawsuit, Aoude-having been found
out-attached a genuine document as an exhibit.1 78 The court of
appeals dealt swiftly with Aoude's argument that the second suit,
which was not predicated on fabricated evidence, should not
have been dismissed:
Appellant remonstrates that whatever disposition may be made
of his original suit, his second suit was filed without any reference
to the bogus agreement and should not have been dismissed.
The assertion will not wash. A malefactor, caught red-handed,
cannot simply walk away from a case, pay a new docket fee, and
begin afresh. History is not so glibly to be erased. Once a litigant chooses to practice fraud, that misconduct infects his cause
of action, in whatever guises it may subsequently appear. Thus,
to the extent that the two complaints paralleled each other, the
second suit17 was, for the reasons already stated, appropriately
jettisoned.
The second approach to the related case is to apply resjudicata
principles. The clearest situation is, of course, where one suit is
dismissed with prejudice because of the plaintiffs fraud on the
court. In such a situation, a subsequent suit on the same cause
against the same party or parties will be barred by res judicata or
claim preclusion.8 0 More likely, however, the fraud-committing
litigant will be involved in subsequent litigation with a different
party or parties and the opponent will seek to use the earlier
892 F.2d 1115, 1121-22 (1st Cir. 1989).
Aoude argued that an additional cause of action was included in his second
suit, but the court held that the additional cause of action was dependent upon a
favorable determination on the original cause of action. Id.
179 Id. at 1121.
180 E.g., Massie v. Paul, 92 S.W.2d 11 (Ky. 1936).
17

178
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court's finding of fraud against the litigant.'81 In this situation,
principles of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, may control the outcome.
For example, in Synanon Church v. United States,'82 the church
brought an action for declaratory judgment against the United
States Government to establish its tax-exempt status. An earlier
case in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia involved
the issue of whether the church was a non-profit corporation
under District of Columbia zoning laws.' 83 The earlier case had
been dismissed after the judge "found by clear and convincing
evidence that Synanon engaged in a 'willful, deliberate and purposeful scheme to.. .destroy extensive amounts of evidence and
discoverable materials which probably would have had a dispositive bearing upon Synanon's ...non-profit status."" 84 After deciding that the issues in the case against the United States were
"substantially identical," and concluding that Synanon had a
"full and fair opportunity to litigate" the issue in the Superior
Court, the district court held that the church was collaterally
estopped from seeking a different conclusion.185 The court
noted that "It]he purposes of the collateral estoppel doctrine conserving judicial resources, protecting adversaries from vexatious litigation, and fostering reliance on prior judicial action by
minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions - are served
by its application here as in other contexts."'8 6
VIII.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL

Appellate courts will review entry of default or dismissal for
perjury or other misconduct for abuse of discretion.8 7 Factual
18, E.g., United Bus. Communications, Inc. v. Racal-Milgo, Inc., 591 F. Supp.
1172, 1185 (D. Kan. 1984) (applying offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel to
set aside judgment for patent infringement).
182 579 F. Supp. 967 (D.D.C. 1984).
"18Id. at 972-73.
Id. at 972 (citing a transcript of an October 12, 1983, hearing in Synanon
I4
Found., Inc. v. Bernstein, No. 7189-78 (D.C. Super.)).
85 Id. at 973 (citing Blonder-Tongue Lab. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313,
333 (1971); Schneider v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 658 F.2d 835, 851 (D.C. Cir.
1981); Carr v. District of Columbia, 646 F.2d 599, 608 n. 47 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
18 Id. at 974 (citing Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979)).
187 E.g., Nat'l Hockey League, 427 U.S. at 642; Keystone Driller Co. v. Gen. Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933) (holding that a court applying the unclean
hands doctrine is "not bound by formula or restrained by any limitation that
tends to trammel the free and just exercise of discretion"); Rockdale Mgmt. Co.
v. Shawmut Bank, N.A., 638 N.E.2d 29 (1994) (fraud on the court); Pierce,688 So.
2d at 1388.
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determinations made in support of sanctions will only be reversed if they are clearly erroneous. 88 The trial court's determination is only disturbed if a review of the record leads to "a
'definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a
weighing of the relevant factors.'"189 As the First Circuit has

said: "the district courts must be accorded considerable latitude
in dealing with serious abuses of the judicial process and the
trier's determination to dismiss a case for such a reason should
be reviewed only for abuse of discretion."'9 " Trial courts will
generally be within their discretion when the evidence is sufficiently clear and a pattern of misconduct is shown.'' The trial
court's discretion is not, however, without limits.
The judge must consider the proper mix of factors and juxtapose them reasonably. "Abuse occurs when a material factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is
relied upon, or when all proper and no improper factors are
assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing
' 92

them."'

Given this deferential standard of review, it should come as no
surprise that defaults and dismissals in fraud on the court and
unclean hands situations are frequently sustained on appeal.
Cases in which the trial judge is reversed typically involve a combination of misconduct that could be described as borderline
and failure on the part of the trial judge to adequately explain
her consideration, and rejection, of lesser sanctions.
For example, in West v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,"93 the alleged misconduct was spoliation of evidence. West was injured
when a tire made by Goodyear exploded while she was attempting to mount it on an oversized rim made by another defendant. 94 West had already successfully mounted a similar tire on
188

E.g., Malautea, 987 F.2d at 1543.

189Wyle, 709 F.2d at 589 (citing Anderson v. Air West, Inc., 542 F.2d 522, 524
(9th Cir. 1976); In reJosephson, 218 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1954)).
190Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1117 (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633
(1962); HMG Prop. Invs., Inc. v. Parque Indust. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908,

915, 916-917 (1st Cir. 1988)).
191E.g., Rockdale, 638 N.E.2d at 32.
192 Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1117-8 (citing Indep. Oil & Chem. Workers of Quincy,
Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 864 F.2d 927, 929 (1st Cir. 1988); Anderson v.
Cryovac, Inc., 862 F.2d 910, 923 (1st Cir. 1988)).
193 167 F.3d 776, 779 (2d Cir. 1999).
194Id. at 777-78.
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a similar rim.19 5 The spoliation claim was based on the fact that
West's counsel had deflated the successfully mounted tire-rim
combination prior to filing suit but after examining and
photographing it and that West had sold his tire changing ma19 6
chine and air compressor while the litigation was pending.
While the trial judge purported to consider and reject as inadequate lesser sanctions, the Second Circuit concluded that dismissal was unnecessary to achieve the aims of sanctions:
We disagree with Judge Owen's conclusion that dismissal constituted the only adequate sanction. It was not necessary to dismiss
the complaint in order to vindicate the trifold aims of: (1) deterring future spoliation of evidence; (2) protecting the defendants'
interests; and (3) remedying the prejudice defendants suffered
as a result of West's actions. Judge Owen could have combined
alternative sanctions in a way that would fully protect Goodyear
and Budd from prejudice. For example, the trial judge could:
(1) instruct the jury to presume that the exemplar tire was overinflated; (2) instruct the jury to presume that the tire mounting
machine and air compressor malfunctioned; and (3) preclude
Mrs. West from offering evidence on these issues.197
Not surprisingly, the more egregious the misconduct, the
more the appellate courts defer to the trial judge's selection of
the sanction. In Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co.,' 98 there was a long
and well-documented history of noncompliance by the defendants with court orders. The Eleventh Circuit, noting that "the
defendants richly deserved the sanction of a default judgment,"
essentially deferred to the trial judge's conclusion that "sanctions less harsh than a default judgment would not have
changed the defendants' behavior."' 9 9 Likewise, in Oliver v.
Gramley,2 °° the Seventh Circuit ruled, in essence, that the trial
court's failure to expressly consider lesser sanctions was, in light
of the egregiousness of the misconduct, harmless error.20 '
IX.

CONCLUSION

Courts are empowered to deal harshly with litigants who act in
underhanded ways to improperly influence the judicial system.
19"Id. at 778.
196

Id.

Id. at 780.
198 987 F.2d 1536, 1542-3 (11th Cir. 1993).
17

199Id. at 1544.
200

201

200 F.3d 465 (7th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 466.
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Sufficient flexibility exists to respond to whatever scheme a misbehaving litigant might concoct, whether it involves perjury,
fabrication of evidence, destruction of evidence, suppression of
evidence, witness tampering, or a combination of these.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and their state counterparts provide some of the tools to address fraud on the court.
These rules, however, do not provide a good fit for most fraud
on the court and unclean hands scenarios. This is, in part, a
result of the fact that the rules do not expressly proscribe perjury, fabrication of evidence, destruction of evidence, and the
like. Where the fit is not good, however, the courts are inherently empowered to respond.
In the right case, one where there is clear and convincing evidence of egregious misconduct by a litigant, counsel must decide whether to proceed to trial and show the malefactor for
what he is through traditional evidentiary presentation or move
to dismiss or default for unclean hands or fraud on the court.
The decision should be informed by an analysis of the likelihood that an ultimate sanction would be imposed and the ability, otherwise, to adequately develop the wrongdoing at trial. If
the misconduct took place in another case, counsel should consider whether the cause of action was "infected" or whether res
judicata and collateral estoppel might apply to the subsequent
case. Finally, because the standard of review of fraud on the
court and unclean hands determinations is very deferential,
counsel on the losing side in the trial court will face an uphill
battle on appeal.
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